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The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: A
Poor Solution to the Housing Crisis
Janet Stearns
The homeless are indeed the most egregious symbol of a cruel econ-
omy, an unresponsive government, a festering value system.
Robert Hayes I
The genius of a market economy, freed of the distortions forced by
government housing policies and regulations that swung erratically
from loving to hostile, can provide for housing far better than Federal
programs.
President Reagan's Commission
on Housing 2
I. The Need for Affordable Housing
The diminishing role of the federal government in the develop-
ment of low-income housing has had severe implications for low-
income citizens. As the quotations above indicate, opinions about
how large that role should be vary greatly. While the debate contin-
ues, however, homeless people are evident on the street corners of
cities and towns throughout the United States. In Connecticut, ap-
proximately 20,000 people stayed in shelters or temporary housing
in 1986.- Nationally, between 250,000 and 350,000 people are
homeless on a given night. 4
While homelessness has many causes, 5 it cannot be eliminated
without the creation of affordable housing. According to the federal
1. Haves, Thoughts, in Homelessness in America 3 (M. E. Hombs & M. Snyder eds.
1982) [hereinafter Homelessness]. Mr. Hayes founded and currently serves as counsel
to the National Coalition for the Homeless.
2. Report of the President's Commission on Housing xvii (1982).
3. Patricia Wallace, Housing Facts in Connecticut 2 (Sept. 29. 1987) (unpublished
data) (copy on file at office of Yale . & Pol. Rev.). See also N.Y. limes, Nov. 29. 1987, at
CN3, col. I (comments of Jane McNichol. Director, Connecticut. Coalition for the
Homeless).
4. Estimates of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for
1984, cited in Hopper & Hamburg, The Making of America's Homeless: From Skid Row
to New Poor, 1945-1984, in Critical Perspectives on Housing 14 (R. Bratt, C. Hartman &
A. Meyerson eds. 1986) [hereinafter Critical Perspectives].
5. The causes of homelessness include the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill,
cutbacks in federal benefits programs, and unemployment. See generally Homelessness,
supra note 1. at 5-7. See also Current Topic, Homelessness: Halting the Race to tile Bot-
tom, 3 Yale L. Pol'y Rev. 551, 552 (1985).
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government, affordable rent is defined as 30% of gross income."
Thus, tenants residing in federally owned housing must pay 30% of
their income as rent. v Many low-income persons, however, do not
benefit from federal housing programs; these people must pay far
more than 30% of their income for rent. For example, more than
ten million renter households paid 35% or more of their income for
rent in 1983; 6.3 million paid 50% or more; and 4.7 millon paid
60% or more. 8 The families who dedicate such large percentages of
their incomes for housing often must routinely choose among such
vital needs as shelter, food, clothing, and health care.
In recent years, market rents have grown at a faster rate than me-
dian income, making housing even less affordable than it was in the
past. In Connecticut, between 1980-85, median renter income rose
by 30%, while median rent increased by 84%. 9 Currently, in New
Haven, the average two-bedroom apartment rent is $716,10 yet a
low-income person with annual income less than $14,000 can afford
to pay only $346 in rent.Il To some individuals, this disparity be-
tween the market rent and the affordable rent-called the af-
fordability gap-is the difference between having a home and being
homeless.
This Current Topic will assess the federal government's most re-
cent attempt to close the affordability gap through the use of tax
subsidies to private developers. It describes the key provisions of
the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, enacted in the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (TRA),12 and evaluates their potential effectiveness.
The Current Topic will argue that the credit in its present form will
be an insufficient incentive for the development of low-income
housing and will propose revisions that would further encourage the
6. Hartman, Housing Policies under the Reagan Administration, in Critical Perspec-
tives, supra note 4. at 368. Hartman reports that the federal government initially
thought 20% of income was appropriate to spend on housing, and raised this figure to
25% in the 1960s. In 1981, the standard was raised to 30%. See Omnibus Reconciliation
Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 402 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A § 1437a(a)(i) (West Supp.
1987).
7. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
8. Editor's Introduction, Critical Perspectives, supra note 4, at xiv.
9. Wallace, supra note 3, at 1.
10. Id. This figure was reported in a February 1987 rent survey conducted by the
Connecticut Housing Finance Authority of 28,443 units in Connecticut. This average
includes utility allowances.
11. This figure is based on calculations by the Connecticut Housing Finance Author-
ity (CHFA). CHFA calculated the amount that a family at 50% of New Haven-area me-
dian income could afford in rent, including utilities, if it were to pay rent equaling 3076
of its income. (Copy on file in office of Yale L. & Pol. Rev.).
12. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 § 252, as amended
(codified at I.R.C. § 42 (1986)) [hereinafter Tax Reform Act].
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private sector to develop this housing. Finally, it will suggest that
tax incentives, as presently designed, are an inefficient government
policy with which to confront the current housing crisis.
II. The Privatization of Federal Housing Policy
With the adoption of the first National Housing Act in 1937 (the
Act), 13 the federal government assumed a central role in assuring
that low-income housing would be produced. The Act's declared
objectives were "to alleviate present and recurring unemployment
and to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and the
acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of
low-income. ... 14 The Act created the United States Housing
Authority, and provided federal funding to states and localities to
eliminate substandard housing and to build low-rent projects in its
place. This legislation initiated the creation of 1.9 million public
housing units, of which 96% presently remain occupied. 15
In the past 50 years, through the creation of key housing subsidy
programs, the federal government successfully has encouraged the
private sector to develop low-income housing.' 6 The federal gov-
ernment reduces the costs of financing development through mort-
gage insurance, in which the government guarantees debt payments
to private lenders. 17 It also authorizes direct loans for low- and
moderate-income families.i 8 The Community Development Block
Grant program funds the administration of nonprofit development
corporations, and land acquisition and site improvements for hous-
ing projects.' 9 Finally, government rent subsidy programs provide
both vouchers to low-income tenants20 and payments to developers
who construct and rehabilitate low-income units.2 1
Despite these achievements, the federal government since 1980
has taken the view that the public sector has failed to provide low-
income housing and the private sector can do better. In 1982, Presi-
13. United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (1937) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437 (West Supp. 1987)).
14. id.
15. They're Still Cheating Housing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1987, at A26, col. 1. Ac-
cording to the editorial, the 4% of the public housing units that are vacant are in need of
repairs for which Congress has not appropriated funding.
16. See generally National Housing Law Project, The Subsidized Housing Handbook,
ch. 2, 2-1-2-33 (1982).
17. 12 U.S.C.A. § 17151(d)(3) (West Supp. 1987).
18. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701x(b) (West Supp. 1987).
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5301 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987).
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f (West 1985 & Supp. 1987).
21. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437o (West 1985 & Supp. 1987).
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dent Ronald Reagan's Commission on Housing argued that govern-
mental functions should be "privatized," or transferred to the
private sector.22 The Commission proposed increased reliance on
private developers and minimal government intervention in these
initiatives. The Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment(HUD) agreed with this approach. "We're basically backing
out of the business of housing, period," noted one HUD Deputy
Assistant Secretary. 23 The most vivid example of this privatization
strategy in operation is the sale of publicly owned and subsidized
housing by HUD to private developers, requiring in return only a
commitment that such housing remain dedicated to low-income per-
sons for 15 years. 24
Further, the Reagan Administration has decreased dramatically
funding for many essential direct subsidies. According to the Na-
tional League of Cities, federal housing appropriations have
dropped from over $30 million in 1980 to less than $10 million in
1987.25 While 183,000 new HUD subsidized units were started in
1980, by 1985 the new start-up number had dropped to an esti-
mated 28,000.26 Not only has the federal government ceased to
provide public housing, but also it has failed to spur private invest-
ment by removing the needed aid that makes low-income housing
projects financially viable for the private sector.
III. Tax Incentives and Tax Shelters
The federal government has never limited its housing policy to
direct appropriations; it has also encouraged the development of
low-income housing through tax incentives. These incentives, or
tax -expenditures,27 entice investment and development by creating
tax benefits that supplement or replace profits lost to the developer
as a result of developing units with below-market rents. Low-in-
come housing requires these subsidies because affordable tenant
22. The Report of the President's Commission on Housing, supra note 2, xvii.
23. Statement of HUD Deputy Assistant Secretary, quoted in Hartman, supra note 6, at
373.
24. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701z-171 1. Note that Congress approved the property disposi-
tion program in 1978, as a means of preserving low-income units. But since 1980 HUD
has implemented the policy in a manner that considers sale prices more than low-in-
come housing commitment. Clay, Risk of Loss: The Endangered Future of Low-In-
come Housing Resources 10 (1987).
25. National League of Cities, A Time to Build Up: A Survey of Cities About Hous-
ing Policy, reported in 14 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 801 (Feb. 23, 1987).
26. Hartman, supra note 6, at 364.
27. These incentives are called tax expenditures because, like direct appropriations,
they result in a revenue loss to the federal fisc. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 622(3) (West 1985).
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rents usually cannot cover the owner's costs of construction, mainte-
nance, and management.
Tax incentive programs have been controversial. Many tax incen-
tives created to increase social welfare have been abused by individ-
uals seeking to shelter their own income and thereby reduce their
tax liability.28 Private investors profit from tax incentives, while the
government loses potential tax revenue. As one critic, Paul McDan-
iel, commented, "One problem is that every time Congress enacts a
tax preference for a particular industry or economic activity, a highly
skilled band of tax and financial advisors with a battery of computers
is ready and able to convert that provision into a tax shelter for their
high-bracket clients." 29
A tax shelter is a partnership or other investment arrangement
designed to assist the investor minimize federal income tax liabil-ity. "o An entity such as a limited partnership invests in a transaction
expected to generate more than one dollar in tax savings for every
dollar invested. The project produces tax savings because investors
can deduct losses such as depreciation 3 ' and interest3 2 from gross
income before determining applicable tax. Tax credits, such as the
historic rehabilitation credit,33 also generate savings by allowing in-
vestors to subtract the credit amount directly from tax liability.3 4
These tax preferences typically exceed the actual equity invested by
the taxpayer because they are calculated on an amount that is not
limited to the taxpayer's actual contribution and that includes bor-
rowed financing. 5 Although these tax shelters affect many sectors
of the economy, they have been most prevalent in real estate.3"
28. McDaniel, Tax Reform and the Revenue Act of 1971: Lesions, Lagniappes and
Lessons, 14 B.C. Ind. Com. L. Rev. 813, 822 (1973).
29. Id.
30. I.R.C. § 6661(c)(ii) (1986). Note that the Internal Revenue Code includes more
than one definition of a tax shelter. See I.R.C. §§ 461(i)(3), 6111 (1986).
31. I.R.C. § 167 (1986).
32. I.R.C. § 163 (1986).
33. I.R.C. § 48(g) (1986).
34. A taxpayer receives the entire value of a tax credit, but only benefits from the
amount of the deduction multiplied by the applicable tax rate. Deductions are thus
worth more to those subject to higher tax rates than to those at lower rates; credits are
worth an equivalent amount to all entities regardless of tax rate.
35. For a description of how tax incentives made the Manhattan Plaza project in New
York City profitable for private investors while less than adequately meeting the needs
of the low-income tenants, see Schur, Manhattan Plaza: Old Style Ripoffs are Still Alive
and Well, in Critical Perspectives, supra note 4, at 277.
36. J. Birnbaum & A. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch 10 (1987).
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IV. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
Advocates of tax reform in 1986 made the elimination of tax shel-
ters one of their priorities. President Reagan called for their elimi-
nation with a plan that would "result in that 'underground
economy' being brought into the sunlight of honest tax compli-
ance." 37 In passing the TRA, Congress responded to the wide-
spread perception that the existing tax code offered myriad
opportunities for abusive tax shelters. The TRA restricts the extent
to which an investor can use deductions and credits derived from
tax shelters to offset earned income. 38 Additionally, by requiring
the investor to be "at risk," or personally liable, for the amount of
the debt that is included when calculating tax liability, the TRA lim-
its the amount of borrowed funds that can be utilized to generate
tax savings.39
The TRA also repealed tax incentives specifically designed to en-
courage low-income housing production, prompting one commen-
tator to write that the Senate Finance Committee "threw the baby
out with the bath water."-40 Previously, the tax code had included
provisions that allowed for more generous deductions, and thereby
increased tax savings, for the costs of acquiring, developing, and op-
erating low-income housing. The TRA removed such prior incen-
tives as: (1) accelerated depreciation, 4' (2) full deductibility of
construction period interest,42 and (3) special capital gains treat-
ment.4 3 The TRA also restricted the issuance of tax-exempt bonds,
the proceeds of which could be loaned by local governments to de-
velopers of low-income housing at below market interest rates.
44
In their zeal to eliminate tax shelter abuse, legislators went too
far. At a time when the housing crisis was worsening and receiving
increasing public attention,45 the Senate repealed tax subsidies that
facilitated the development of low-income housing without adopt-
ing alternative incentives. In response to the cries of lobbyists con-
37. President's State of the Union Address, Jan. 25, 1984, as reported in id. at 40-41.
38. I.R.C. § 469 (1986).
39. I.R.C. § 465 (1986).
40. Sheppard, Mitchell's Low Income Housing Amendment Adopted, 31 Tax Notes
1281 (1986).
41. I.R.C. § 167(k) (CCH 1981). This section is still in effect for expenses incurred
prior toJan. 1, 1987, for low-income projects. However, the TRA terminates this incen-
tive for future low-income housing projects, rather than extends its effect.
42. I.R.C. § 189 (CCH 1981) (repealed by Tax Reform Act, § 803(b)(1)).
43. I.R.C. § 1039 (CCH 1981) (repealed by Tax Reform Act, § 301). See Schwartz,
Real Estate and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 16 Real Est. Rev. 28, 35 (1987).
44. See I.R.C. §§ 141-147 (1986).
45. See text accompanying notes 3-4 and 8-11.
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cerned about the effects of tax reform on low-income housing,
therefore, the Senate Finance Committee Chair, Robert Packwood,
first proposed the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC).46
Packwood, who was commonly known as "an unabashed advocate of
using the income tax to give incentives to private industry and to
promote social action, " 47 was receptive to the coalition of low-in-
come housing advocates and members of the real estate lobby
searching to preserve politically acceptable tax shelters.
The legislative history of the LIHTC is scant. The credit was not
in the version of the bill that Packwood presented to President Rea-
gan on March 11, 1986, but it was included in the draft submitted at
the full committee markup one week later.48 The feasibility of the
hastily drafted credit could not have been fully considered during
this one-week period. In fact, problems with the drafting of the bill
were substantial. The credit was first modified by the full Senate, 49
again in the conference committee, 50 and is the subject of many sub-
stantive revisions in the Technical Corrections Act of 1987. 51
The LIHTC was the only new tax expenditure program in the
TRA, and was created at a time when many tax shelters were elimi-
nated. Its emergence can be explained by the presence of bipartisan
support for the goal of assisting low-income housing. Even con-
servative Republican Senator Robert Dole endorsed the credit, re-
marking, "I support low-income housing and I recognize that
federal participation in this type of housing is appropriate, as well as
inevitable."-52 The unanimous rhetoric in favor of the credit, how-
ever, should not be allowed to obscure the LIHTC's many inade-
46. 132 Cong. Rec. S8148 (daily ed. June 23, 1986) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
47. J. Birnbaum & A. Murray, supra note 36, at 183. See also S. Surrey & P. McDaniel,
Tax Expenditures 101 (1985).
48. Reports contemporaneous to Sen. Packwood's meeting with the President indi-
cate that the bill was "tough" on real estate. 13 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 831 (Mar. 10,
1986). See also J. Birnbaum & A. Murray, supra note 36. The version submitted to the
committee included the LIHTC. 13 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 874 (Mar. 24, 1986).
49. 132 Cong. Rec. S8158 (daily ed. June 23, 1986) (reporting approval of Amend-
ment No. 2153).
50. Conf. Rep. No. 99-841, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 11-85-103, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4076, 4173.
51. Technical Corrections Act of 1987, H.R. 2636 and S. 1350, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987), reprinted in Joint Committee on Taxation, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., Descrip-
tion of the Technical Corrections Act of 1987 (P-H) (June 18, 1987) [hereinafter Techni-
cal Corrections Act]. At the time. this article was written, it was anticipated that the
Technical Corrections Act would be enacted by Congress in 1987. In fact, Congress did
not enact these legislative amendments and, as of early 1988, no immediate action is
expected.
52. 132 Cong. Rec. S8153 (daily ed. June 23, 1986) (remarks of Sen. Robert Dole).
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quacies. A close examination reveals that the LIHTC is seriously
flawed and that it will be an ineffective incentive program.
V The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
The speed with which the LIHTC was drafted belies its complex-
ity. The tax credit, which provides an investor with a credit for a
percentage of his or her investment in new construction, acquisi-
tion, or rehabilitation of low-income housing, contains many com-
plicated rules and restrictions, the most significant of which are
outlined below.
.4. Credit .mount
The TRA provides for a 70% present value credit, which the tax-
payer takes annually over 10 years, as approximately 9% of initial
investment made for new construction and substantial rehabilitation
that is not federally subsidized. For acquisition costs and for reha-
bilitation of new buildings with certain federal subsidies, the credit
equals 30% present value, or approximately 4% over 10 years. 53 In
either case, these percentages are applied to that fraction of residen-
tial units that are dedicated to low-income use. 54
The present value calculation is intended to recognize the "time
value" of money. If the entire credit could be taken at once, it
would equal 30% or 70% of the project costs. But because the tax
benefits to the investor are spread out over a decade, the present
value of the credit is worth less than its nominal value. Therefore,
the total dollar amount of credits taken over 10 years is greater than
its present value. For buildings placed in service after 1987, the
Treasury is required to calculate the exact percentage that will sat-
isfy the present value requirement. 55
B. Qualified Buildings
The credit applies to residential rental property meeting certain
minimum standards. A developer must choose at the outset
whether: (1) at least 20% of the units will serve individuals whose
income is 50% or less of area median gross income (the "20-50
test"); or (2) at least 40% of the units will serve individuals whose
income is 60% or less of area median gross income (the "40-60
53. I.R.C. § 42(b) (1986).
54. I.R.C. § 42(c) (1986).
55. I.R.C. § 42(b)(2) (1986).
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test"). 56 While a developer can choose to dedicate more units in a
project to low-income individuals, and thereby receive a greater tax
credit, 57 these minimum standards set the threshold for utilizing the
credit.
C. Rent Restrictions
For residential units that are dedicated to low-income individuals
for purposes of the tax credit, the gross rent charged, including util-
ities, cannot exceed 30% of the maximum allowable income as de-
fined under the 20-50 or 40-60 tests. 58
D. Recapture Provisions
If the low-income units do not continue to serve low-income indi-
viduals for a period of 15 years, the TRA mandates recapture of a
portion of the credit.59 This provision requires owners to certify
annually that tenants continue to meet the income guidelines. 60
E. State Allocations
The TRA requires that each state be allocated a maximum
amount of credit disbursement authority equal to $1.25 per capita.6'
Further, each state is required to designate a state housing agency
responsible for the allocation of credits to developers, and to assure
that more credits will not be promised to developers than are avail-
able under the per capita limits. 6 2 In order for an individual to take
the credit, he or she must obtain an allocation of credits from the
applicable state agency.
F. Sunset Provisions
The new low-income housing tax credit requires that buildings be
placed in service between January 1, 1987, and December 31, 1989,
56. I.R.C. § 42(g)(1) (1986).
57. The eligible basis is equal to the lesser of the ratio of low-income units to total
residential units or the ratio of floor area space in low income units to total residential
floor area. I.R.C. § 42(c)(1) (1986).
58. I.R.C. § 42(g)(2) (1986).
59. I.R.C. § 42(i)(1),(j) (1986).
60. 52 Fed. Reg. 23,432 § 1,42-1t(a)-h(2) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 602) (tempo-
rary regulations, June 22, 1987).
61. I.R.C. § 42(h)(3) (1986).
62. A similar framework was adopted for tax-exempt bonds. I.R.C. § 146 (1986).
Projects receiving tax-exempt financing are not covered by the LIHTC per capita limits.
I.R.C. § 42(h)(4)(a) (1986).
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in order to take advantage of the tax benefits associated with this
program.63
G. Passive Loss Rules
The TRA restricts the amount of deductions or credits from "pas-
sive" activities that an investor can use against earned income. A
passive activity, according to the Internal Revenue Code (Code), is a
trade or business in which the investor does not participate materi-
ally. 64 The exceptions to the passive loss rules are more generous
for low-income housing investments than for other real estate activi-
ties. 65 Therefore, for individuals whose adjusted gross income does
not exceed $100,000, the Code generally allows maximum deduc-
tions of $25,000 to offset non-passive income. The special rules ap-
plying to low-income housing allow individuals with adjusted gross
incomes of up to $200,000 to use the $25,000 offset.ti 6
The amount of allowable credit is the "deduction equivalent," or
the amount of tax savings generated by a $25,000 deduction. The
maximum amount of credit that can be taken is the highest tax rate
of 28% multiplied by $25,000, or $7000. These rules apply only to
individuals, closely held C corporations, 67 and personal service cor-
porations. 68 Other corporations are exempt from the passive loss
rules and are therefore able to invest without limits in the tax credit.
VI. An Evaluation of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
The LIHTC's success in addressing the housing crisis depends on
its ability to induce private developers to finance, create, and main-
tain affordable housing units. The credit, however, has both sub-
stantive and procedural flaws that seriously hinder its efficacy as an
incentive program.
63. I.R.C. § 42(n) (1986). The Technical Corrections Act provides for limited one
year carryover after 1989 if for unforeseen reasons a building that received credit alloca-
tions could not be placed in service. Technical Corrections Act § 10 2 (l)(1 7 )(a).
64. I.R.C. § 469(c)(1) (1986).
65. I.R.C. § 469(i)(3)(B) (1986).
66. Note that the TRA enacted a phase-out of the passive loss rules above the maxi-
mum allowable income of $200,000. For incomes ranging from the maximum to
$250,000, for every two dollars of excess income the passive loss limit is reduced by one
dollar. See I.R.C. § 469((i)(3) (1986).
67. A closely held corporation is one in which a maximum of five individuals directly
or indirectly own more than 50% of the corporation's outstanding stock. I.R.C.
§ 469(0)(1) (1986).
68. A personal service corporation is one in which services are substantially per-
formed by an employee who owns stock in the corporation. I.R.C. § 269A(b)(l-2)
(1986), as amended by § 469(j)(2) (1986).
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A. Development of Affordable Housing
The LIHTC is a mediocre substitute for the coordinated attack
that is needed to provide affordable housing for the homeless. To
qualify for the tax credit, a developer need set aside only a portion
of the building for low-rent units; the rest of the building can serve
moderate- and upper-income individuals. These set-asides, under
either the 20-50 or the 40-60 rule, will be inadequate to induce the
production of sufficient numbers of very-low-income units. 69
The tax credit delegates the choice between the threshold 20-50
and 40-60 options solely to the private sector. Economic reality will
force many developers to minimize, either qualitatively or quantita-
tively, the production of low-rent units in order to maximize the
rental income stream of the project. The rational developer will
either place the minimum number of very low-income tenants in a
project, or will allow more tenants at a higher income range. Plan-
ners of projects that will serve only very-low-income tenants will
choose, out of financial necessity, to set rents at the higher 60%
range.7 0
The difference between the selection of the 50% or 60% area me-
dian income limits is significant. When an owner chooses the 40-60
plan instead of the 20-50 plan, the LIHTC makes little or no contri-
bution toward bridging the affordability gap for welfare recipients.
For example, in New Haven an individual receiving general assist-
ance 7' receives a housing allowance of $300 per month.72 The max-
imum rent under the 20-50 plan would be $303, whereas the
maximum rent under the 40-60 plan would be $363. 73 The addi-
tional $60 would make this apartment unaffordable for a large part
of the New Haven population that is in need of housing.
The federal legislation provides no additional incentives for the
developer to shelter more than 20% of tenants at below 50% of
median income. In fact, by requiring developers to choose between
direct subsidies and the tax credit, the LIHTC fails to encourage the
69. In this section, I will use "very-low-income" to refer to incomes of less than 50%
of area median income. "Low-income" will refer to incomes of less than 60% of area
median income.
70. J. Guggenheim, Tax Credits for Low Income Housing: New Opportunities for
Developers, Non-Profits, and Communities under the 1986 Tax Reform Act 10 (1986).
71. 17 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 273 (1985).
72. Interview with Edward Mattison, Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City of
New Haven (Nov. 10, 1987).
73. Calculations by the Connecticut Housing Finance Authority regarding eligible
rents under the LIHTC under the 20-50 and 40-60 plans, based on New Haven-area
median income (copy on file with Yale L. & Pol. Rev.).
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aggregation of funding sources that would enable greater numbers
of very-low-income units to be created.7 4 According to the presi-
dent of one real estate firm involved in development and syndica-
tion of low-income housing, "[a]bsent other subsidies, it seems
unlikely that projects will be built for the very low income since the
rental rates will be outside their reach."7 5 The tax credit is not the
deep subsidy required to spark the development of very-low-income
units.
B. The Burdens of Recapture
The Code's new requirement that investors either maintain the
low-income units for 15 years or face recapture penalties will further
deter investment in low-income housing. Prior tax incentive pro-
grams did not require such long-term commitments from develop-
ers, because the deductions were generally allowable upfront. In
theory, the recapture provisions are an important response to com-
plaints advanced by housing advocates under prior tax regimes-
that private investors lacked continuing incentives for maintaining
the housing for which they had received benefits. In reality, how-
ever, this solution creates new problems: investors face a spectrum
of potential investments, and recapture may deter those who are al-
ready wary of the risks involved in low-income housing
development.
The difficulty of encouraging low-income housing development is
compounded by the fact that low-income tenants, especially those
who recently have been homeless, often need special social services
in addition to standard building upkeep. As a result, those develop-
ers who choose to invest in low-income housing are forced to con-
sider the special needs of tenants residing in such units. A long-
term plan for management of the properties is crucial. According to
one expert, Charles Carlisle, "[d]evelopment of a management plan
with special emphasis on low-income housing needs will be critical
to the success of the venture.- 7 6
Although tenants have these needs, the National Housing Law
Project reports that many managers, given the choice, "would rather
not deal with large families, single-parent households, welfare cli-
74. The Code requires the investor to either exclude the federal subsidies from ba-
sis, the amount on which the tax credit is calculated, or take the lower credit rate of 30%
of present value. I.R.C. § 42(i)(2) (1986).
75. Carlisle, The Credit for Low Income Housing: Whose Shelter is it?, 3 Real Est.
Fin. 44, 57 (1987).
76. Id.
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ents, and other so-called problems." 77 Owners may have a natural
tendancy to "cream"--evicting tenants with the greatest behavioral
problems and replacing them with less troublesome ones. One ten-
ant residing in the Columbia Point Project in Boston, Massachu-
setts, which is being financed in part with the LIHTC, complained
that, "[a]lready the new security is harrassing the teens and some
families had to move." 78 Private managers must demonstrate sensi-
tivity and commitment to assisting their low-income tenants.
Owners of low-income housing must be more than dedicated to
assisting low-income tenants; they also need training in issues of fi-
nancial management and tenant relations. These issues have
plagued federal housing for 50 years. 79 For example, in Boston, the
Housing Authority was placed in receivership for egregious financial
mismanagement.8" Similarly, the Pruitt-Igoe Project in St. Louis,
Missouri, was demolished due to its poor conditions."' The spectre
of these troubled public housing projects is so strong that private
developers will be unlikely to enter this market without greater
assistance in tenant management. We cannot expect the private sec-
tor, within the brief amount of time allotted for use of the LIHTC,
to be able to discover resolutions to these special problems, which
have eluded public housing specialists for decades.
Additionally, the 15-year recapture rule necessitates annual moni-
toring and certification by the I.R.S. of the incomes and family sizes
of all tenants.8 2 With this rule, Congress has tried to assure that
these subsidized units would serve truly low-income people for a
period of time. However, George Delta, a private practitioner, has
called the reporting requirements "needlessly complex" 8 3 and sug-
gested that these provisions will only further discourage private
investors.
77. National Housing L. Project, supra note 16, at 11-10.
78. Martha Bush quoted in Community Rises from Boston Slum, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15,
1987, at A59, col. 1.
79. Bratt, Public Housing: The Contribution and the Controversy, in Critical Per-
spectives. supra note 4, at 346-48.
80. Id. at 347.
81. Id. at 335.
82. 52 Fed. Reg. 23,432 § 1,42-1t(a)-h(2) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 602) (tempo-
rary regulations, June 22, 1987).
83. Delta, A Critique of the Low-Income Housing Credit, 3 Tax Mgmt. Real Est. J.
114 (1987).
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C. State Credit Allocations
Bureaucratic constraints further deter private developers from
utilizing the LIHTC. By delegatingto the states the responsiblity
for disbursing the tax credits, the TRA added an additional level of
bureaucracy for the private sector to surmount. The states were
surprised to discover that the TRA delegated them substantial new
responsibilities, 84 particularly since the LIHTC was not a program
for which they had lobbied, but one designed by the Senate Finance
Committee without their prior consultation. The states had diffi-
culty accepting these duties and establishing allocation systems. For
example, although the tax bill was signed by the President on Octo-
ber 22, 1986, and went into effect on January 1, 1987, it was not
until April 1987 that Connecticut's governor resolved a power
struggle between three state agencies with responsibility for hous-
ing programs, finally designating the Connecticut Housing Finance
Authority (CHFA) the LIHTC allocating authority. 85 Apparently,
many other states encountered similar turf battles.8 6
Delay in establishing state allocation systems was due in part to
the Treasury Department's delay in promulgating guidelines. Tem-
porary regulations, clarifying the procedure to be followed by the
state allocating authority, were not issued until June 1987.87 Under
these regulations, a developer desiring to take advantage of the tax
credit must apply to a state agency that will review the project in a
process that may take up to two months. This review process is
designed to ensure that a state does not over-allocate its fixed
number of credits and that it properly certifies all allocations in writ-
ing to the Internal Revenue Service. Some consultants have ex-
pressed concern, however, that this review process will not
completely prevent overcommitment. To minimize this possibility,
they recommend that developers either monitor the state's alloca-
tion process or request that the state issue warranties.8 8
Clearly, the complexity of the regulations means that additional
bureacracy will be required on the state level to administer this pro-
84. Remarks of Michael Ward, Connecticut Housing Finance Authority, Low-In-
come Housing Tax Credit Workshop, Hartford, Conn. (December 20, 1986).
85. Exec. Order No. 19, Apr. 24, 1987 (filed with the Connecticut Secretary of State,
Apr. 27, 1987); interview with Carol A. Montesi, Planner and Program Analyst, Connect-
icut Housing Finance Authority (Dec. 7, 1987).
86. 14 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 576 (Dec. 1, 1987) (statement of Carl W. Riedy,Jr.,
Executive Vice President, Council of State Housing Agencies).
87. 52 Fed. Reg. 23,432 (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.0-1-1.58-8 and 602) (tem-
porary regulations, June 22, 1987).
88. Carlisle, supra note 75, at 55.
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gram properly. Federal regulations authorize the states to charge
an administrative fee to help cover the costs of the program. Con-
sistent with this authorization, CHFA, for example, is charging an
application fee of $250 to nonprofit developers and $500 to for-
profit developers, and assessing an additional processing fee. The
state of Washington charges a commission ranging from 5-10% of
the first-year credit amount.89 Virginia imposes a flat fee of $3000,
while Texas levies $5 per unit, with an ongoing annual fee of 2% of
the credit amount. 90 Through these fee structures, states pass along
program expenses to the private sector. These fees operate as yet
another disincentive to developers contemplating a low-income
project.
D. Sunset Provisions
Even if the LIHTC were to provide substantial incentives to new
housing development, its impact would be blunted by the extremely
brief duration of the subsidy. The tax credit is only a three-year
program, for the years 1987 through 1989. The temporary regula-
tions guiding key issues of program operation were not even issued
untilJune 1987. 91 On November 3, 1987, the Treasury Department
announced that these temporary regulations, with one amendment,
would serve as the "proposed" regulations; the comment period for
these regulations ended on January 4, 1988, more than a. year after
their effective date. 92 Thus, final regulations will not be effective
until well into the second year of the credit. The proposed rules
detail the state allocation process, but still leave many issues un-
resolved regarding the use of the tax credit.
Investors are naturally wary of experimenting with an untried and
uncertain program. Yet by waiting to view the success of early
projects, developers may not have sufficient time to complete their
own housing projects before the legislation sunsets. To alleviate
this concern, the Technical Corrections Bill provides for limited car-
ryforward of credits allocated in 1989 for projects that had been
started but not completed for reasons the developer could not have
foreseen. 93 However, many credits allocated to the first year of the
89. 14 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 1011 (May 4, 1987).
90. Id. at 951.
91. 52 Fed. Reg. 23,432 (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.0-1-1.58-8 and 602) (tem-
porary regulations, June 22, 1876).
92. 52 Fed. Reg. 42,116 (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. §§ 1 and 602) (proposed regula-
tions. Nov. 3, 1987).
93. Technical Corrections Act § 102 (1)(17)(a).
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program's operation will end up unused, primarily because of the
hesitation of investors to act in the absence of clear governmental
guidance.
E. The Costs and Complexities of Syndication
The financing arrangements needed to optimize the use of the tax
credit, in tandem with tax shelter reforms implemented by the TRA,
have created further barriers to the success of this subsidy program.
The TRA, by restricting the ability of individuals to shelter income,
has altered the financing arrangements through which real estate
transactions have traditionally been conducted. Because they could
not use them all, developers, or sponsors, typically "sold" tax bene-
fits to third parties in exchange for cash needed to cover project
costs. Likewise, the LIHTC is not actually taken by the developers;
it is transferred to individuals or corporate entities in exchange for
equity contributions to the project. From a policy perspective, the
problem is that the developer receives less than the full amount of
the credit in equity; a portion of the credit covers the costs of the
transaction and the profit to the investors.
Syndication, the predominant financing arrangement for real es-
tate, allows investors to pool their resources in order to acquire tax
benefits and to fund development. 94 Typically, the investors will be
limited partners in a syndicate, thereby insulating themselves from
risk yet securing the maximum tax benefits. The general partner
will develop and operate the project. Federal securities laws require
the partnership to comply with disclosure and registration rules if
the transaction requires a public offering. 95 A private placement is
sufficient, however, if only a small number of investors is involved, 96
or if the investors are institutional entities ("accredited investors")
presumed not to require the protections afforded by SEC
registration.9 7
Syndication is cumbersome and costly. 98 Significant financial and
legal expertise is required to maximize the tax benefits to investors
within the limits established by the IRS. The price of obtaining the
94. See generally Berger, Real Estate Syndication, 69 Yale LJ. 725 (1960).
95. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a-77aa (West 1981).
96. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(2) (West 1981) (exempts transactions by an issuer not involv-
ing a public offering). The Securities and Exchange Commission has determined that a
transaction is not a public offering if less than 25 persons invest. General Counsel's
Opinion, Securities Act Rel. No. 285, Jan. 24, 1935.
97. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(6) (West 1981).
98. See Hoin, Does Real Estate Syndication Provide a Viable Financing Strategy for
Low Income Housing?, 50 Brooklyn L. Rev. 913 (1984).
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necessary lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers to conduct
a public offering can be prohibitive for the developer and can rap-
idly offset the benefits of the tax credit. Further, promoters of a
public offering earn at least 10% of the proceeds of the offering in
commissions and organizational fees. These commissions include
discretionary accounts-which allow for, among other things, en-
tertainment of investment bankers-all funded by the government's
housing policy.' " And, while this type of transaction may be coin-
monplace for the major real estate developer, it may discourage the
involvement of the less financially savvy persons desiring to produce
housing for the homeless.
The TRA's attack on tax shelters has altered the structure of syn-
dications and the composition of the parties to the syndication.' 0 0
Deterred by the passive loss rules, high-income individuals are
slowly being replaced by corporate investors. As many of their
traditional government subsidies have been eliminated, nonprofit
developers are attempting to expand their role in this arena of hous-
ing finance as general partners. These transitions take time, how-
ever, and forestall the use of the tax credit.
1. Individual Investors. Prior to the TRA, wealthy individuals
comprised the vast majority of investors in real estate syndications.
Even though the passive loss rules are more generous for investors
of low-income housing than for those of other real estate transac-
tions, they are not generous enough to permit the involvement of
wealthy investors. One analyst, Janet Novack, notes the "schizo-
phrenia" that shaped the design of the credit: "[Tlhe biggest hitch
of all [in using the LIHTC] is that the credit is of little use to the
high income individuals who would be suitable investors in these
potentially high-risk deals."'' 1
Individuals with income ranges of less than $200,000 were not
major investors of low-income housing before the TRA, and it is
unlikely that they will have either the available income or the tax
incentives to invest now. Taxpayers will quickly expend the strict
limit on passive losses, and they may already be absorbing losses
that were generated in past years from other investments. ' ° 2 Fur-
99. Interview with Steve Stogel, Vice-President, McCormack, Baron and Associates,
Inc. (Oct. 22, 1987) [hereinafter Stogel interview].
100. Caffee & Zelko, The Low-Income Housing Credit of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, 7 Real Est. Sec. J. 44-45 (1987).
101. Novack, Hitch 22, Forbes, Feb. 9, 1987, at 54.
102. The Internal Revenue Code allows for carryforward of passive losses. I.R.C.
§ 469(b) (1986).
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thermore, these individuals must continue to qualify under the in-
come guidelines over the entire 10-year period that they take the
credit. As a result, an investor must anticipate at the outset that his
or her position will not substantially improve.
The income and passive loss limitations also necessitate that more
funds be raised from larger groups of individuals. The TRA has
increased the likelihood of public offerings, and thereby the costs of
raising capital for low-income housing production. 0 3 These costs,
and the overall decline in the availability of individual investors,
have led developers to seek new markets for equity contributors.
2. Corporate Investors. With many individual investors out of
the picture, syndication of corporate investors is likely to be the pre-
dominant means of using the tax credit.' 0 4 Corporations, exempt
from the passive loss rules, can obtain greater tax benefits for equity
contributions to a tax syndication than can individuals. Despite
their promise of tax benefits, however, corporations have been slow
to recognize the value of these investments.' 0 5 Prior to the TRA,
few syndicate promoters worked with corporations, 0 6 and these
promoters are just beginning to educate corporate America about
equity funds that can be used for the LIHTC.' 0 7
Those corporations who do invest in low-income housing syndica-
tion deals are not motivated solely by tax savings. They appear to
be influenced as much by community relations as by profits: They
are interested in being perceived as socially responsible corporate
citizens. Syndicate promoters attempt to appeal to these senti-
ments. For example, the Chicago Equity Fund advertises as a bene-
fit of this investment, "[n]ational and local recognition for
supporting a major new housing initiative with visible and signifi-
cant impact across the city."' 08
Nationally, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, operated by
the Ford Foundation, and the Enterprise Social Investment Corpo-
ration, operated by the Rouse Corporation, have taken the lead in
building corporate equity funds.' 0 9 The Chicago Equity Fund and
103. Carlisie, supra note 75, at 56.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68 for discussion of passive loss rules.
105. See Stevens, Tax Incentives for Low-Income Housing: Another Look, 3 Tax
Mgmt. Real Est. J. 167, 170 (1987).
106. Carlisle, supra note 75, at 56.
107. Novack, supra note 101.
108. Executive Summary, Chicago Equity Fund 1987 Partnership 2 (1987).
109. Tax Credits Produce Housing for Poor, N.Y. TimesJan. 17, 1988, at R I, col. 2.
Both LISC and Enterprise were also instrumental in lobbying for the tax credit, and
were cited in the Senate debate on the bill. See 132 Cong. Rec. S8149 (daily ed. June 23,
1986) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
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the Connecticut Equity Fund serve as regional vehicles for the cor-
porate community to invest in low-income housing. 10 To date,
these funds have gathered more contributions than they have been
able to invest in projects.''' This is because they have just begun
creating tax credit deals with general partners who have sites that
they are interested in developing and operating. Site selection in a
climate of community resentment towards homeless and low-in-
come persons is difficult. 1 2 An additional explanation for the cur-
rent surplus of corporate financing is that these funds will invest
only in projects involving a nonprofit organization, 1 3 and the non-
profit sector has been slow to enter the syndication market. Never-
theless, the emergence of these attempts at public-private
partnerships to create low-income housing may be the most positive
consequence of the LIHTC.
3. Nonprofit Sponsors. From the perspective of a nonprofit or-
ganization that is interested in operating low-income housing, the
new world of financing has proven complicated. Traditional gov-
ernment subsidy programs did not require the same amount of tech-
nical resources to obtain a project. According to Karl Hilgert, of
Christian Community Action in New Haven, "in the old days, they
offered you low-income housing and you just had to sign on the
dotted line."' '14 Under the Community Development Block Grant,
for example, government officials worked directly with local housing
nonprofit corporations and drafted simple contracts of understand-
ing regarding the use of the funds.' 15 Applications for such federal
grants did not require the assistance of an attorney. But nonprofit
groups today have been forced by the decline of direct government
subsidies to consider complicated tax incentive deals.
As a result, such organizations have confronted three problems.
First, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations cannot use the credit
themselves, because they do not have tax liability that the credit can
110. Remarks of Arthur Anderson, Executive Director, Connecuit Equity Fund, Low
Income Housing Tax Credit Workshop, New Britain, Conn., Sept. 9, 1987.
11. Stogel interview, supra note 99.
112. Impediments to site selection for low-income housing include the not-in-my-
backyard phenomenon. See generally A Response to Nimby, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1987, at
A22, col. 1.
113. LISC, for example, will only invest in projects that involve a community-based
nonprofit organization. Remarks of Patrick Johnson, Executive Director, National Eq-
uity Fund, Low-Income Housing Workshop, New Britain, Conn., Sept. 9, 1987.
114. Interview with Karl Hilgert, Director of Christian Community Action, New Ha-
ven, Conn. (Apr. 1987).
115. Interview with Jennifer Pugh, former Administrator, Community Development
Block Grant Program, City of New Haven, Conn. (Dec. 17, 1987).
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offset.' '" Instead, the tax-exempt entity must transfer the entire
amount to taxable entities in exchange for equity financing. Consid-
ering the costs of syndication, the tax-exempt organization will
surely never receive the full value of the LIHTC. Therefore, a non-
profit organization interested in operating low-income housing
would prefer a direct subsidy to a tax incentive.' 17
Secondly, tax-exempt entities confront legal barriers that prevent
them from assuming the position of general partner in a syndica-
tion.' 1 For example, tax-exemption may be threatened by profit-
motivated deals such as a syndication. A fundamental conflict of
interest exists between the dual obligations of the tax-exempt en-
tity-its statutory duty to provide that "no part of the net earn-
ing. . . . inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual"' "9 -and its fiduciary duty as general partner to promote
the investments of the private partnership. 120 As a result, nonprofit
corporations must insulate themselves from the profit-motivated as-
pects of the partnership by explicitly waiving such duties in their
partnership agreement. '2 '
Even if fiduciary duties are waived, nonprofit entities face an addi-
tional legal concern. The allocation of profits and losses required
under partnership tax is still problematic. The Internal Revenue
Code requires income and losses to be allocated among partners to
reflect the "substantial economic effect" of the transaction.i 22 But
because nonprofit organizations do not have taxable income, they
are unable to utilize the deductions from losses. A wholly owned
for-profit subsidiary is able to take the losses, making this structure
preferable for those nonprofit corporations using the tax credit.'2
3
Thirdly, even if the structural problems posed by the conflicts in-
herent in the tax and partnership laws are resolved, the costs of syn-
dication may still be prohibitive. For nonprofit organizations to
survive in the modern era of real estate finance, therefore, they will
116. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986).
117. See generally Warren & Auerbach, Transferability of Tax Incentives and the Fic-
tion of Safe Harbor Leasing, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1752 (1982) (discussing analogous prob-
lem of tax incentives to for-profit corporations that do not have taxable income). ,
118. See generally Note, Low Income Housing Under the New Conservatism: Trickle
Down or Dry Up?, 26 Santa Clara L. Rev. 461 (1986).
119. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986).
120. Uniform Partnership Act (U.L.A.) § 21 (1969).
121. Spring, Tax Considerations for Section 501(c)(3) Organizations Engaged in
Real Estate Development Activities, 4 Preservation L. Rev. 2065 (1985).
122. I.R.C.§ 704(b) (1986).
123. The Technical Corrections Act to the TRA envisions the use of a for-profit
subsidiary of a nonprofit organization as general partner. While the subsidiary may re-
solve some of the legal issues, the nonprofit organization still requires legal assistance to
establish such an entity. Technical Correction Act § 102(1)16.
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need substantial legal and financial guidance. This expertise is ex-
pensive, and most nonprofit entities do not have highly specialized
lawyers and accountants to assist in the coordination of these pub-
lic-private partnerships.
VII. Reforming the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit-A Short-Term View
With all its drawbacks, the LIHTC remains the predominent fed-
eral subsidy for affordable housing. Until it undertakes more funda-
mental reform of its housing policy, Congress should improve the
LIHTC's effectiveness. Eight specific measures will enable the
LIHTC to fulfill the expectations envisioned by its rhetoric.
First, the tax credit must be redesigned to maximize the amount
of revenue that can be raised for low-income housing. Increasing
tax shelter opportunities for wealthy individuals will encourage their
financial contributions. To the extent that it is politically feasible to
expand this one area of tax preference without concurrently ex-
panding others, many investors could be prompted to contribute to
low-income housing projects. So long as tax policy is the federal
government's only means of encouraging investment in low-income
housing, then tax shelters must be expanded to promote the impor-
tant social goal of developing more affordable housing units.
Second, the credit amounts should be restructured to provide ad-
ditional incentives to those developers who choose to dedicate more
than the minimum 20% of the project to low-rent units. Additional
credits also could be allowed to those who dedicate larger quantities
of units to those with less than 50% of median income. A simple
revision would allow for the 70% credit to be taken even if other
federal subsidies finance the project, so long as more very-low-in-
come people are served. Such a reform would acknowledge the eco-
nomic reality that additional subsidies are essential when rental
income is further constrained.
Third, HUD should facilitate the creation of workable public-pri-
vate partnerships. The department is in a position to coordinate
information on effective management efforts, drawing on the expe-
rience of public housing over the past 50 years. Annual reporting
requirements should be relaxed, with HUD taking a more active role
in assuring compliance. Further, HUD's legal and financial exper-
tise could dramatically reduce the transaction costs of putting to-
gether the deals. By circulating sample partnership agreements and
offering plans, the government could reduce the costs to the public
sector of assuming responsibility for low-income housing. The IRS
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already assists with the production of forms and agreements in
other settings. 24 Providing such technical assistance in the housing
area would do much to serve low-income Americans.
Fourth, the federal government should absorb the costs of ad-
ministering the allocation of the credits. Although HUD should
have been given this responsibility initially, now that the states are
operating this bureaucracy, they should be reimbursed by the fed-
eral government for the administrative costs, rather than be permit-
ted to pass them along to the developers in the form of application
fees and commissions.
Fifth, Congress should act now to extend the authorizing legisla-
tion for the tax credit, and to allow for full carryforward of the cred-
its. As they consider projects in 1988 and 1989, investors must feel
secure that the credit will be available to them. Uncertainty is possi-
bly the greatest barrier to future investment in low-income
housing. 12 5
Sixth, the passive loss rules should be relaxed to allow individuals
to achieve further tax benefits for investing in low-income housing.
Individuals with incomes over $200,000 are searching for ways to
shelter their incomes; by opening this particular market, substantial
revenue could be channeled into low-income housing. In addition
to raising the maximum eligible income, the $25,000 set-aside
should be increased. This relief would lower the costs of generating
needed revenue by decreasing the need for public offerings. Devel-
opers have identified this reform as a priority and are currently lob-
bying for such passive loss amendments. 2 6
Seventh, shortening the period of time over which the credit is
taken also would make the incentive more attractive to developers.
Investors have been wary of contributing funds to a project that re-
quires them to wait a decade to achieve the return of these funds.
The tax credit would be more palatable to private investors if the
credit could be taken over five years, the period of time that they
generally pay into the development, rather than the 10-year period
provided by current law.' 2 7
124. For example, the IRS helps nonprofits attain tax exmpt status. Tax Exempt
Status for Your Organization, IRS Publication No. 553 (rev. July 1985). Also, the Treas-
ury Department has drafted sample pension plans that qualify for preferential tax treat-
ment; TRA directed the Treasury to draft necessary amendments. Fax Reform Act
§ 1140(B).
125. Stogel interview, supra note 99.
126. Id.
127. Letter to John Sheiner, staff of the U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion, from Steve Stogel, Apr. 30, 1987 (copy on file with Yale L. & Pol'y Rev.).
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Finally, the tax credit should be refundable. The IRS should pay
a nonprofit organization the excess of the allowable credit over the
entity's tax liability. This innovation remedies the inefficiency of
tranferring tax benefits by allowing the taxpayer to receive the full
amount of the subsidy, even if the taxpayer is without sufficient or
any tax liability. The only credit currently refundable is the Earned
Income Credit, 28 which was intended to exempt low-income indi-
viduals from the Social Security tax.' 29 For fear of revenue loss,
Congress has been resistant to extending the concept of
refundability to other tax preferences. However, such a reform
could significantly improve the targeting of tax benefits to those
who are responsible for the development of low-income housing.
VIII. Tax Incentives as a Housing Policy-A Long-Term View
In addition to making short-term revisions to the tax credit, Con-
gress needs to examine the wisdom of relying on tax subsidies,
rather than on direct subsidies, to promote the development of low-
income housing. For maximum impact, federal housing policy
should be directed to assist those in need of affordable housing. A
coherent Congressional debate on federal housing expenditures
should include an assessment of the costs and benefits associated
with every subsidy program.
Such a cost-benefit analysis reveals the inefficiency of the LIHTC.
For every dollar of tax credit lost from the federal fisc, only about
$.50 will be contributed for low-income housing. 30 This disparity
is common to real estate syndications. A 1977 Congressional
Budget Office Report concluded:
Only about half of what the tax shelter subsidy costs the government
in lost revenue, however, ever reaches builders and developers. The
remainder goes in the form of payments to the outside investors for
the use of their money, and in fees to the syndicators, lawyers, and
accountants who are needed to put together and sell the tax shelter
package. 13'
128. I.R.C. § 32 (1986).
129. S. Surrey & P. McDaniel, supra note 47, at 110.
130. Telephone Interview with Richard Goldstein, Lane & Edson (Feb. 9, 1988).
For a discussion of the inefficiency of tax subsidies, see generally, Note, Multi-family
Housing Bonds: Can the Tax Code Provide an Efficient and Effective Low Income
Housing Program?, 5 Va. Tax Rev. 497 (1986).
131. Cong. Budget Off., Real Estate Tax Shelter Subsidies and Direct Subsidy Alter-
natives xiv (May 1977).
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The report calculated that 44.5% of the total subsidy went to build-
ers and developers, 7.4% to syndicators, and 48.1% to outside in-
vestors. 132 Developers, syndicators, and lawyers stand to profit
from preparing tax credit deals. These profits divert needed fund-
ing from the beneficiaries of the subsidy program-the low-income
person.
This analysis should not imply that low-income individuals do not
receive any benefits from tax subsidies to developers. Repealing tax
preferences for low-income housing will detrimentally affect low-in-
come persons as well as syndicators. "Thus, an elimination of tax
provisions that reduce income taxes on rents from low and moder-
ate income housing is likely to be reflected partially in higher rent-
als, thereby producing a burden distribution quite different from
that suggested by the official estimates."' 33 Although elimination of
tax expenditures will undoubtedly affect rent levels, the substitution
of a more direct incentive would optimize the use of federal funds
and target benefits to the group in need.
The choice between the two funding methods has been shaped by
political considerations. Not until the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 were estimates of tax expenditures included in the federal
budget. 13 4 But this Act did not subject tax expenditures to the same
budgetary procedures as were imposed on direct outlays. Mandated
budget targets apply only to direct outlays, not to tax expenditures.
Likewise, the Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, which imposes
mandatory spending reductions to control the magnitude of the fed-
eral deficit, applies only to direct outlays.' 3 5 Tax expenditures re-
ceive preferential treatment in the budget process.
This separation of tax expenditures from the annual budget pro-
cess partially explains the Congressional impetus to adopt tax subsi-
dies for housing even though they are less cost-effective than are
direct outlays. Moreover, policymakers wrongly perceive tax ex-
penditures as less expensive, simpler to administer, and more con-
sistent with the American capitalism.'13 6  For some, "[tiax
132. Id. at 10.
133. Graetz, Assessing the Distributional Effects of Income Tax Revision: Some
Lessons from Incidence Analysis, 4 J. Legal Stud. 351, 365-66 (1975).
134. S. Surrey & P. McDaniel, supra note 47, at 1. See generally Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 298 (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 621-661 (1985)).
135. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
177, 99 Stat. 1063 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 901 (1985)). Note that Bowsher v. Synar, 106
S. Ct. 3181 (1986) held unconstitutional a section of the statute that delegates to the
Comptroller General the responsibility for implementing the budget reductions.
136. S. Surrey & P. McDaniel, supra note 47, at 99-102.
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expenditures have proven consistent with the ideology of free enter-
prise and individual initiative."'' 37 Further, some legislators, like
Senator Packwood, believe that tax expenditures result in less bu-
reaucracy-the "absence of red tape" rationale. 38 Given the exten-
sive bureaucracy that will be required to administer the LIHTC, this
view is misguided.
The political debate is also disjointed by the fact that different
committees in both the House and the Senate consider taxes and
the budget. Internal discussion is exacerbated, and political strug-
gles only fragment the selection of expenditure method. Without
reform, we will continue to have a fiscal policy that tolerates the
slashing of government outlays for low-income housing and com-
munity development programs while preserving tax benefits for
such luxury items as vacation homes.13 9 Only by considering the
entire federal budget at the same table can Congress can begin to
allocate scarce resources more rationally.
The political biases that affect the selection of the subsidy pro-
gram ignore the actual economic differences between the direct sub-
sidies and tax subsidies. Financial assistance through tax subsidies
does not reach certain types of recipients, such as tax-exempt orga-
nizations and others that do not have taxable income. Only if the
effect of the tax subsidy is equivalent to that under a direct outlay
system should Congress consider the incentive programs as
interchangeable.
The refundable taxable credit is equivalent to the direct subsidy.
As discussed above,' 40 refundability requires the government to pay
taxpayers the amount of the credit that exceeds tax liability; for a
nonprofit corporation, this refund would constitute the entire
credit.' 4 1 If a nonprofit entity could raise equity from the govern-
ment, it would not need to undertake the costs of syndication. More
housing could be produced with less revenue loss to the
government.
Enactment of this reform would remove the economic disparity
between the effects of direct and tax subsidy approaches. Without
reform, direct subsidies continue to be more efficient and effective
137. Id. at 101 (citing Haveman, Tax Expenditures-Spending Money without Ex-
penditures, 9 Nat'lJ. 1908 (Dec. 10, 1977)).
138. Id. at 101.
139. Sheppard, Our Lopsided Federal Housing Tax Policy Analyzed by National
League of Cities and Price Waterhouse, 27 Tax Notes 233 (Apr. 15, 1985).
140. See text accompanying notes 128-29.
141. To be equivalent to a direct subsidy, this credit should be also included in taxa-
ble income. S. Surrey & P. McDaniel, supra note 47, at 110-11.
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at providing financial assistance to the developer of low-income
housing. Poorly designed tax incentives, like the LIHTC, will always
be inferior to a direct subsidy alternative.
Conclusion
The low-income housing tax credit will help a few developers
make ends meet, especially those already in the business of produc-
ing low-rent units. However, the credit will not encourage enough
private developers to build affordable housing to fill the void left by
the federal government's relinquishing the field. The private sector
will not assume responsibility for providing affordable housing for
the homeless until low-income housing becomes a more profitable
industry. Therefore, reform efforts must again focus on the
government.
An appropriate federal response may include a mix of private and
public ownership and maintenance of housing units. But any private
sector participation in meeting the need requires that the federal
government provide generous subsidies, assure monitoring of the
quality of housing produced, and facilitate the development of
projects by presenting technical, financial, and legal expertise.
The problem of homelessness is not dissipating. The shortage of
affordable housing will continue to increase into the 21 st century. 142
Congress must act now to appropriate funding for needed programs
and to design workable incentives for the private sector. The Ad-
ministration must support these critical government expenditures.
Otherwise, the rhetoric of privatization merely serves as a smoke-
screen for a deficit reduction plan that deprives low-income Ameri-
cans of affordable housing.
142. Clay, supra note 24, at 4.
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